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Background 
In the last ten years the global meat industry has encountered numerous critical 
events related to food safety and food quality. These events in turn have caused the 
industry to re-evaluate how the meat supply chain functions and how to service the new 
social attributes demanded in the market place.  Issues like source-verified, non-GMO, 
and organic are becoming important sources of product differentiation.  How should 
firms in the meat supply chain respond? 
Several studies (Fearne, 1998; Viaene and Verbeke, 1998; Lobstein 2001; and 
Yeung and Morris, 2001) have described and assessed the drastic changes in the Western 
European meat industry due to food scares and consumer distrust in the regulatory 
system. The motivation for these studies relies on the catastrophic consequences of food 
safety scandals that directly affected this region. Events such as the Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak and its  link to human neurological Creutzfeldt-Jacob 
disease (VCJD), the re-appearance of the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) after decades 
of free status, and concurrent biological and chemical contamination in food products, 
have shaken the entire European meat industry. As a result, the survival of this industry 
has been forced to evolve to high levels of coordination in the chain relationships and to a 
complex delivery of new social attributes (Gow and Goldsmith, 2002). 
On the other hand, countries like the US, which have not faced in vivo such 
chaotic events, have implemented preventive measures and new regulations at the 
margin. Some experts (Schuff, 2001; Ginsburg 2001) believe that the current regulatory 
system  is vulnerable requiring  further action. Lobstein (2001) suggests that the meat 
industry should not simply take reactive and preventive measure but should be ready for 
unexpected food safety problems. Dailey (2001) also believes that to assure a trustworthy Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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meat system, new and solid alliances between governmental agencies and  the  meat 
industry are needed. According to Martin (2001) about 6 out of 10 Americans are 
concerned that Europe’s BSE problem could affect the US; moreover, according to a 
survey from the Food Marketing Institute cited by the same author, the consumer faith in 
the US food supply has eroded from a confidence level of 84 % in 1996 to a level 10 
points lower in 2000.  
For the global meat industry the assurance of safe products and the supply of new 
social attributes could be a daunting task. According to Sporleder and Goldsmith (2001), 
events such as BSE, FMD, genetically engineered products, and animal welfare signal 
rising expectations for firms in the food and agricultural supply to deliver social 
attributes. According to these authors there are numerous mechanisms by which trust and 
food safety can be assured, the more traditional  strategies  involve governmental 
approaches while the more promising, given the new environment, involve firm-level and 
third party  strategies, such as third party protocols, branding,  indemnification, and 
vertical alliances  and integration
i.    While it is clear how the European industry is 
responding, how should the US meat industry react? 
Underlying Theory 
There are two general theories of organizational adaptive change.  From the 
complexity theory literature (Leifer, 1989; Stacey, 1995; Macintosh and Maclean, 1999) 
the concepts of entropy and far-from equilibrium portend the potential for organizations 
radically reconfiguring themselves as their niche compatibility becomes untenable.  
Operating far from equilibrium necessitates new strategic architecture which are not 
found through mild experimentation.  An important component to the complexity view of Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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organizational transformation is the role of a major critical and external event that 
initiates this process of change. In relation to this study, food scares and the demand of 
new social attributes could be a external force that might or might not cause the industry 
to start a major process of fundamental change; like that which we see in Europe. 
On the other hand, rugged landscape theory (Levinthal, 1997; McKelvey, 1999) 
and strategic management theory portend a more incremental (and limited) process 
(Quinn, 1980,  Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989;  Quinn et al, 1990; Mintzberg, 1994; 
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997).  Modern theories of strategy posit that radical moves are 
inconsistent with the fundamentals of the strategy process; a process described as logical 
incrementalism (Quinn et al, 1990).  Because organizations are complex and strategy 
emerges from within the organization and not simply senior management (Mintzberg, 
1994), long jump strategic changes envisioned in the complexity theory literature are 
unrealistic.  
Similarly,  rugged  landscape theory states that firms move along peaks  that 
represent multiple optima offering alternative organizational forms and business models 
(McKelvey, 1999). The ruggedness of the environment is a function of the number of 
attributes  necessary for survival (industry complexity) and the degree of industry 
interconnectedness (Levinthal, 1997).  Two stylized systems can exist: one heterogeneous 
with many peaks (organizational forms) and low maxima, and another with a singular 
dominant organizational form and a unique maximum.  In their search for greater fitness 
firms gravitate toward peaks (successful models); an adaptation process.  At the same 
time population forces are selecting organizational forms; a selection process. Firms can Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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therefore always be attempting to improve their fitness while at the same time the local 
peak they are climbing may be far from the global optimum, and the firm is doomed.   
Research Objective and Methodology 
These competing theories frame our research objective.  We wanted to study how 
the meat industry is responding to the recent events involving food safety.  We have two 
central questions regarding the  industry’s response; the rate of change,  i.e., radical or 
incremental, and more importantly the rationale for this strategy choice.  
In our quest to empirically answer these questions we faced a methodological 
dilemma.  What data are available to study?  How might one provide evidence about the 
strategic intent of our study industry, especially  as it appears paradoxical in light of 
recent events?  While this is partly a predicament of agribusiness research and the paucity 
of secondary data (Goldsmith and Dissart, 1998; Boehlje, 1999) it is also a predicament 
of strategy research.  The grounded research approach
2 has proven quite successful when 
attempting to understand strategic intent in the present or when the subject is extremely 
dynamic
3.  A simple review of the recent literature pertaining to the meat industry reveals 
very little information about industry behavior at the firm or transaction level
4.  While 
numerous researchers admit  that  the food and agricultural  industry  is undergoing 
structural change, there has been no work, with the exception of Boland et al (1995) and 
Katz and Boland (2000) studying the implications of this structural change at the firm 
level.  This has become even more evident with the recent crises related to food safety 
where the work is dominated by analysis from a policy and government perspective (see 
                                                 
2 One good example is Brown and Eisenhardt (1997).  
3 Dynamics is particularly pernicious because even given a large N, stationarity problems dominate the 
problem. 
4 e.g. Macdonald et al, 1996; Buhr and Kim, 1997, Zaibet and Bredahl, 1997, Unnevehr et al 1997, 
Anderson ,1999; Drabenstott et al, 1999; Ollinger et al, 2000; Morrison and Katherine, 2001; Wachenheim 
and DeVuyst, 2001 Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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Spriggs and Isaac, 2001).  We argue  there is a  need  for complementary firm-level 
research as consumers, policy makers, and the industry wrestle with how best to deliver 
safe food.  We attempt to fill some of the gap of knowledge. 
To accomplish this we have employed a simple yet unique approach to help yield 
some empirical evidence.  It involves three empirical methodologies all focused on the 
same meat supply chain (Chicago, Illinois); 1) semi-structured interviews with supply 
chain managers;  2) videotaping retail meat cases to document exactly what is being sold, 
and 3) consumer interviews eliciting preferences (conducted by another research team, 
Swanson (2001)).
5  
The research process began with a review of the work conducted by Swanson 
(2001). Their survey tried to elicit how consumers think about their meat purchases.  We 
followed up Swanson’s work by visiting some of the same stores involved in the survey 
as well as interviewing mangers in their supply chains.  While Swanson asked consumers 
what they wanted in the fresh meat case, we wanted to see what consumers were actually 
offered.  With permission of management we were then able to videotape the meat case.  
We also interviewed managers from the store back to the packer to understand how meat 
is bought and sold in the modern US meat supply chain.  By triangulating the survey, 
videotape, and interviews a clear picture could be drawn of how the supply chain was 
responding in a world of turbulence and why it was responding in that way.  
The Swanson Study 
The purpose of their survey was to better understand consumer’s stated 
preferences for social attributes and their willingness to pay for those attributes.     
                                                 
5 In terms of timing, the semi-structured interviews were conducted first in the winter and early spring of 
2001.   Swanson then conducted his survey in the late spring and summer (2001).  Videotaping followed 
later in the summer of 2001. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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Swanson conducted a consumer survey in the spring of 2001. This survey included 934 
respondents from six supermarkets  in the Chicago metropolitan area. The six 
supermarkets included two independent stores, two specialty meat stores, one cooperative 
supermarket and one natural grocery store. Income levels greater than $100,000 per year 
represented 20 percent of the customers in one of neighborhood, 50 percent in three other 
neighborhoods, and almost 75 percent in the last neighborhood. The majority of the 
respondents were women (at least 70 % across all the supermarkets) with ages mostly 
between 40 and 60 years old.  49% of the respondents were professionals, 18% 
housewives, and 17% retired.  The surveys were handed out in the stores, filled out at 
home, and then mailed in with the postage paid envelope that was provided. 
This likert-scale questionnaire listed 18 characteristics that influence meat-
purchasing decisions among consumers. The characteristics can be grouped as followed: 
1)  Attitude towards price 
2)  Quality perception like visible traits, quality grades, branded meats and taste. 
3)  Health concerns related to the absence of antibiotics, preservatives and 
hormones, the use of non-GMO feed, and organically produced meat. 
4)   Environmental and humane handling concerns. 
5)  Interest in convenience products such as pre-prepared and pre-packaged 
meats 
6)  Other issues related to the importance of package, locally produced meat, 
irradiation and slaughter practice (kosher and halal) 
 
Concisely summarizing their results, price was only moderately important comparable to 
health concerns such as no preservatives, antibiotics or hormones (Figure 1).  Most 
important was product presentation, quality grades, and taste.  Organic, environmentally 
friendly, and humanly-raised were  relatively less important.  While not completely 
mirroring, European consumer response (see Salvador, 2002; Gow and Goldsmith, 2002) 
these results do reflect some consistency with European consumer’s attempts to reform 
the meat safety system and Martin’s (2001) recent article in Nation’s Restaurant News.  Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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If these results are robust, one would conclude that consumers appear to prefer natural 
products and higher quality cuts, and they are willing to pay for it.   
Semi-structured Interview and Direct Observation 
  Using a semi-structured interview instrument (Yin, 1994; Gummesson, 2000) and 
direct observation  (Kumar, 1989),  our research methodology analyzed three  of the 
Swanson stores and their supply chains (plus three other stores for validation purposes).  
Four overarching questions were behind our approach; how does the US meat distribution 
system operate,  how well is the chain operating, how is the chain responding to the 
turbulence in the global supply chain, and finally what is the degree of dissonance with 
respect to critical product attributes across the supply chain from consumers to packers.   
The semi-structured interview instrument was structured in the form of a needs 
assessment (Johnson et al, 1987; Soriano, 1995).  Needs assessment is a technique in 
business relationship management for suppliers to learn how their client’s business 
operates.  It specifically focuses on the day-to-day operations that the manager 
(interviewee) deals with.  It elicits from that manager how business is done, where 
problems and challenges exist, and what would make the business run more smoothly.  
By conducting a needs assessment the supplier elicits from the client how their own 
product and service contributes to the client’s success and where new sales and service 
opportunities might lie.   
The needs assessment approach was particularly valuable for us when attempting 
to understand the impact of the recent market turbulence related to social attributes.  
While there has been much media attention to these issues, respondents may be biased in 
their responses when directly asked how the turbulence affects their business. Instead Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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with the needs assessment approach, the manager reveals how the business is performing, 
the satisfaction of their clients, and where they would like to see changes in the 
meat/animal products they are buying and re-selling.  All business factors are “fair game” 
as the discussion is not preset to be about the social attribute issue.  If a need arises on its 
own concerning, for example, source verification, one could then  link environmental 
turbulence and an industry response.
ii   All interviews were taped and transcribed.   
The needs assessments were compared within and across supply chains and with 
consumers as expressed in the Swanson study.  All interviews were conducted with 
either, owners or senior or mid-level management. Sixteen managers were interviewed 
(Figure 2).  Three were in meatpacking; two represented a national firm (P1) and one was 
a small independent (P2).  Three wholesalers were interviewed; one represented a large 
national cooperative (W1), one a large regional cooperative (W2), and one was the buyer 
for a large regional retail chain (RC).  Ten retail managers were interviewed, two 
managed a local mid-sized cooperative chain (CO), six owned or managed three 
independent retail stores (I1, I2, I3), one owned small speciality retail meat market (SM), 
and one was a case manager in a large regional retail chain (RC).   
The interview instrument contained 170 open-ended questions.  Not all questions 
were asked to all supply chain members  because interviewees  were heterogeneous 
representing the breadth of the supply chain and did not hold the same positions in 
management.  Interviews were held on-site and lasted on average two hours. All but two 
interviews were tape recorded and transcribed.  To analyze the transcripts we used a 
software program called QSR-N5 NUD*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing 
Searching and Theorizing). Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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Direct Observation 
The in-site observations included four retail stores in the Chicago metropolitan 
area: two independent family owned supermarkets (I1 and I2), one cooperative 
community owned supermarket (CO), and one supermarket that was part of a large food-
drug retail chain (RC). I1 and I2 were considered “high-end” supermarkets since their 
locations in wealthy neighborhoods (a western suburb and a northeastern district 
respectively). CO was associated with a more diverse and urban clientele; this store was 
located in a southern neighborhood. Finally RC was considered a super-store with a more 
aggressive marketing strategy and it was located in the same community as I2.  
Besides their willingness to participate in the study, three factors were considered 
in the selection of the stores: 1) the aim of having the most heterogeneous group as 
possible, in term of type and size of the stores, consumer orientation, and demographic 
context; 2) the necessity of including high-end supermarkets where supposedly social 
attributes are more likely to be offered or addressed; and final, the participation of the 
stores in the in-depth interviews and the consumer survey
6.  There was very good overlap 
between in-depth interviews, meat case analysis, and the Swanson study. 
The subject meat cases were systematically digitally videotaping making sure to 
capture individual products, their labelling, and packaging. Due to the focus of the study, 
only fresh meats were considered  – processed, canned and frozen meats were not 
included.  The meat categories were broken down as follows:  Regular – fresh meat cuts 
traditionally offered in all meat departments; Enhanced  – those products in which 
additional value was added to the regular product (i.e. stuffed chicken breasts as opposed 
                                                 
6 It is important to mention that these four selected stores had each two managers interviewed, and a 
random group of their consumers (except for the case of RC) accounted 88 % of the respondents in the 
Swanson survey. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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to regular chicken breasts); Low volume – those items which are not high in demand (i.e. 
lamb fries, pigs feet.)  Within each category, the meat data was sorted into species type: 
beef, veal, pork, lamb, chicken, turkey and specialty.  Specialty meats are those products 
such as rabbit, duck and Cornish hens.  Observations were conducted at the end of the 
week (Thursday and Friday) when meat cases are generally at their fullest. 
An important caveat with this kind of research is the robustness of the results.   
We recognized the limitations of such qualitative research and attempted to address, ex-
ante, as many of the validation questions (see Goldsmith et al, 2001) as possible.  
Extensiveness (Yin, 1994) was addressed through cross-sectional data collection across 
supply chains as well as within supply chains.  Triangulation was achieved through the 
semi-structured instrument that asked each chain member (whenever possible) similar 
questions framed in a similar way.  By means of the meat case analysis through direcvt 
observation empirical evidence was also bolstered by factually verifying what managers 
claimed was consistent with what was in the meat case. 
Results 
Context 
As mentioned above we focused on four retail stores which were subsets of the 
Swanson study and our supply chain interviews (Table 1).  There were 530 fresh meat 
SKUs 
7 across the four videotaped stores; 30% in the chain retailer, 32% in the co-op, and 
22% and 16% in the two independent retailers (Figure 3).   The chain retail store had 2.5 
meat SKUS/1,000 sq.ft., the co-op 3.3, and the two independents 5.5 and 1.8 respectively.  
Thus the two independents differed in their retail focus with respect to meat.  Of the six 
                                                 
7 Individual products known as “Stock Keeping Units.” Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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major species, beef comprised 39% of the SKUs, pork 21 %, poultry 30%, lamb 5% and 
veal 4% (Figure 4).   
Over 90% of the SKUs originated from the major packers
8.   Of the 530 SKUs  
27% were branded (Figure 5).  The leading branded species was poultry (51%) followed 
by pork (29%).  While 65% of the branded products originated from the large packers, 
there were 11 other brands
iii.  Contrary to what might have been expected from the 
Swanson survey, only 11% of the facings were natural,
iv most of these originating from 
the large packers.  Poultry was by far the leader among natural products (85%) (Figure 
6).   
Recent Food Scares 
None of the interviewees were concerned about the recent food safety incidents.  
For example at the time of the interviews there had been a “BSE scare” in Texas which 
made not only the industry news but also the national news (Schuff, 2001).  None of the 
interviewees raised the issue on their own when our needs assessment approach raised 
questions about performance of the supply chain.  When  prompted at the end of the 
interview, most had not heard of the incident and those that had, were unconcerned.  At 
the end of one interview with a major national meat cooperative wholesaler, we asked 
how familiar he was with what was going on in Europe (meat scares and depressed meat 
consumption.)  We asked whether any of his membership had asked about traceability or 
BSE, he replied, “not really.”  Pressing we asked if there had been any e-mail traffic from 
his member retailers.  To this he said, “some.”  When asked what were member retailers 
asking, he stated simply, “if our meat was safe and I told them it was.”  We asked, 
                                                 
8 Tyson, Perdue, IBP (now part of Tyson), Excel,  Farmland, Smithfield, Gold Kist, ConAgra (Butterball), 
and Hormel. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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“would an overnight fall in demand of 10, 20… even  70% be of concern to the 
membership.”  He replied, “did that happen in Europe?”  We asked whether engaging in 
a planning exercise focused on the area of risk assessment and management might be of 
use to the membership, he thought that might be a good idea, but it was probably 
“…ahead of its time....”   
 In general, meat agents perceive that major events like BSE and FMD are 
external issues that have not really affected the domestic industry. However, most of the 
retailers and wholesalers recognized that BSE and FMD are part of their daily business 
conversations. Four of the five retailers -the specialty store, the two independent stores 
and the retail chain- admitted that a small proportion of their customers have inquired at 
least general questions about BSE and FMD. They perceived that the media has done a 
good job educating the public, particularly in the case of BSE. Only  one retail chain 
manager noticed a decrease of meat sales when these two events were at their height. 
According to the managers of the retail chain and the independent store one, FMD caused 
more alarm in consumers than BSE, even though it is well known that FMD does not 
directly affect humans. The managers felt that consumer alarm around FMD was more 
based on the fear about meat availability and the possibility of higher prices.  
One of the wholesalers noticed that meat recalls have become more common, but 
according to him, this increase in meat recalls is mainly related to better control 
procedures. Moreover, according to the store manager of I1, the number of meat recalls is 
insignificant compared with the tonnage moved by meat packers. The director of the 
Meat Division in W1 mentioned that meat recalls usually have a slight and temporary 
effect on the sales of the recalled cut. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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Meat packers believe that one of the major changes in food sanitation in the last 
ten years is the implementation of Hazard Analysis and Control of Critical Points 
(HACCP). In general interviewees perceived that HACCP improved the handling of meat 
products particularly at the processor level.  However, some interviewees –Carcass Sales 
Manager of M1 and Meat Department Manager of RC- suggested that this procedure 
should be extended to other players in the chain like producers and retailers.  According 
to the safety manager of the major meatpacking plant, clean handling and food safety 
programs remain top priorities in their daily activities.  
In general, meat agents are satisfied and  confident with USDA and FDA 
regulations.  Overall the managers all  assumed that the current regulatory system 
guaranteed a wholesome product. One of the wholesalers also mentioned that in the meat 
supply chain nobody is really demanding greater control, different practices, or greater 
assurance in the commercialization of meat products. 
Traceability 
According to the meatpackers interviewed, traceability or source of verification in 
the meat industry is not currently necessary because cattle is “closely guarded and 
regulated.” Furthermore, they felt, the implementation of such a system would require 
major transformations that the meat industry is not prepared for. The foremost efforts in 
traceability and source of verification are found in certain branded meat programs. For 
example, according to the small meat packer, Certified Angus Beef (CAB) is working on 
a system to track animals from birth in order to assure their black lineage. Currently, full 
traceability is not part of the CAB program.  None of the meatpackers were aware of or 
interested in the high-level traceability systems that are been implemented in Europe. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
  14 
Wholesalers and retailers also believe that currently there are not reasons to 
justify traceability or source of verification in “domestic” meat products. According to 
the meat specialty store manager and one of the independent store managers, consumers 
are really just worried about whether the product is domestic
9.    There was a uniformly 
high degree of trust of the US meat supply chain by the i nterviewees.  (The most 
common complaint was about access to product and price.)  
Table 2. Reasons that explain the absence of traceability or source of verification 
  Interviewees  
It is not necessary now, regulatory system works pretty well  5 
Consumers  are not interested in traceability of domestic 
meat. 
5 




  While the survey did not address the question of traceability, the meat case 
analysis revealed no evidence of source verification or traceable products.  It is important 
to note that while the discussion of traceability is proceeding at a rapid pace in Europe, 
i.e. Britain’s animal passport system, traceability is not in evidence in this study’s meat 
cases, even in the 27% of the products that are branded and 11% that are “natural.”   
There are two ways to interpret these results; the first is that the meat industry is 
ignoring the larger forces affecting the world’s meat supply chain.  Alternatively these 
results could indicate a lack of change because the value proposition of changing the 
strategic architecture (see Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) does not exist for firms in the 
supply chain.  Integrated firms argue they achieve a form of traceability because the 
                                                 
9 We verified that this meant consumers preferred the domestic private label non traceable lamb product to 
an imported fully traceable branded lamb product originating from a high quality EU-style plant. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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animals originate from their own barns.  Also, for all meat packing plants there is full 
traceability back to the plant
10.   
Quality 
  An important indicator of the evolutionary state of an industry is to assess the 
everday language that is being used by management (and labor) and with customers.  As 
noted above “source verification” and “traceability” was not to be found in the meat case 
nor was it raised as a need by the managers.   While much of the food industry may be 
differentiating, the US meat industry still is dominated by the broad and static grades and 
standards of the USDA.  39% (209) of all meat SKUs were beef.  Of these, 10.5% were 
branded, incorporating company information and 51% had some sort of government 
grade (Prime, Choice, or Select.) the remainder had no information pertaining to quality.  
Of the SKU’s with government grades, 5% were Prime, 68%, Choice, and 27% Select.  
One of the independents for example had over 78% of their beef SKUs with no quality 
information on the label or package.  These results describe a commodity supply chain 
well in place, with retailers believing the foundation of the consumer proposition is price.  
This was confirmed in our interviews as well.  From the most elite meat market to 
the volume buyers, they all used the language of the USDA; “Prime”, “Choice”, and 
“Select” and their relation to price.  Conversations with managers support the notion that 
there is only a limited need for more consumer information pertaining to US meat 
products.  For example one of the lengthiest discussions we were involved with occurred 
between a manager and an assistant general manager as to their meat purchasing strategy.  
                                                 
10 In a recent paper (2002) Gow and Goldsmith analyze the US system’s preference for ex-post 
risk mitigation versus Europe’s ex-ante precautionary principle.  
 Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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They disagreed why they offered Select products; was it the leanness or the margin
11?  As 
well, the smallest and most exclusive meat shop we visited felt that the quality of meat 
coming through formal channels was quite satisfactory.  His differentiation occurred 
through service, i.e. custom cutting. Finally, a meat manager in an independent in a high-
end neighborhood responded that his greatest concern was price, not quality.  He wanted 
to figure out how to compete on price if they were to invest in a store-brand of meat.  
As opposed to the Swanson study, when the issue of quality was raised, the topics 
were not social attributes, but logistics and efficiency issues.  Addressing these issues 
underlies the supply chain’s overall satisfaction with the products emerging from the 
large packers.  The packers have addressed a quality problem that has plagued the 
downstream part of the chain for many years.  With advent of boxed-beef, and now tray 
packs (case-ready) a buyer of meat, i.e. wholesaler, retailer, or restaurant, is now able to 
“sell what they buy.”  In the past with a hanging carcass there were all sorts of 
opportunities for losses, from waste, trim, spoilage, poor processing, etc.  The quality 
attributes processors in the last few years have concentrated on are; reducing purge (the 
liquid in the meat pack), presentation, uniformity of cut, shelf life, uniformity of 
packaging, quality of packaging, not to mention in-plant labelling and pricing.  All these 
attributes make wholesaling and retailing a much less risky and more efficient endeavour.  
Retailers now know, much like with their center isle items, what is bought can then be 
sold.  The packing industry has fundamentally addressed the perishability problem.  
Removed are many of the “games” associated with price, product shrink, and product 
quality.  The retailer is able to reduce its labor demands in the meat section, open up 
                                                 
11 Select grades are less expensive to purchase.  When combined with a “lean” label, consumers are willing 
to pay a premium for a lower costing product.  This occurred in a large cooperative grocery with a very 
urban clientele. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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more selling space, dramatically reduce waste, eliminate the need to process hamburger, 
and better match supply with customer traffic flows.  These efficiency attributes 
associated with the product not only help the large retailers but simplify business for the 
small retailer as well.  
Price 
Price was one of the dominant topics in the interviews. Price plays a key role in 
every transaction along the supply chain from producers to consumers. The manager of 
W1 mentioned that “price is an important factor since quality and specification are pretty 
much standard in meat products,” particularly with beef.  
By–in-large meat case SKUs are managed as commodities.  Communication with 
suppliers is arm’s length, and relationships are completely transactional
12.  Managers 
were asked indirectly about industry structure and access to product.  All did not find that 
the limited number of firms inhibited their purchases.  Most found the oligopoly 
competitive and it simplified the ordering process.  One wholesaler commented that the 
four purveyors he normally dealt with was a good number, more would add unneeded 
complexity  to the buying process and heterogeneity to the product and  fewer would 
promote non-competitive behavior. Added to the industry mix were numerous “brokers” 
who add liquidity to the system and valuable competitive discipline.   
It is important to understand the main drivers of the meat supply chain  are 
perishability and volatile consumer demand. Access to product without wild swings in 
price is critical for the planning process both at wholesale and retail.  A commodity 
model, as opposed to a differentiated product/service model is of value because it 
simplifies transactions and allows for ample substitutability.  Buyers described a process 
                                                 
12 (see Rackam et al (1990) for a discussion of transactional relationships) Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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of continually mitigating price and supply risk by varying to some degree the volume of 
business with any one supplier.  One always keeps open access to alternative marketing 
channels to avoid being caught short or from being “held up.”  The largest retailers for 
example buy from the field for an additional reason; their demand exceeds the supply of 
one packer.  Each packer too optimally supplies many buyers thus avoiding being overly 
committed to one buyer.  One of the largest meat buyers in the study remarked that he 
had to buy all his meat in “a half hour,” because his volume could move markets.  If the 
market found out the chain store was planning a special on a particular cut of meat, prices 
would start to rise with each additional phone call the meat buyer had to make.  Avoiding 
being caught short is a major need throughout the chain.  Smaller buyers grumbled not 
about quality
13 or even so much about price, but about access to the product; whether the 
product came from their wholesalers or when  they  purchased directly from packers.  
They all agreed industry structure was not a limiting factor and found little need to 
change the system
14.   
Purchasing decisions between retailers and wholesalers depend almost solely on 
price. Retailers, even in high-end markets, consider that price is a priority when dealing 
with meat suppliers. Interviewees described in detail about how price discovery occurs 
and how they protect themselves from “buying high.”  For retailers, this is one of the 
reasons they  rely on multiple purveyors.  R espondents (not including the meat-packer 
managers) uniformly agreed that big meatpacking plants offer the best prices.   
Retailers are also price driven because, according to them, consumers focus on 
price in their meat purchasing decisions. Although managers from high-end markets, like 
                                                 
13 Overall everyone along the chain and across store types was quite pleased with the product. 
14 One group of small independent retailers was intrigued by the idea of directly sourcing their product and 
is currently working with producers and University Extension to explore the idea of a private brand. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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independent store two, mentioned the importance of other attributes such as service and 
quality, they also agreed that their customers  were concerned about price. Two 
interviewees, one serving a high-end restaurant and the other a high-end independent 
store, mentioned anecdotes where customers switched to other stores just because of 
price. This result contradicts the Swanson survey where consumers, especially in high-
income neighborhoods, ranked relatively low the importance of price in their purchasing 
decisions.   
One meat manger in a high-end independent store conveyed an anecdote that had 
occurred earlier that week.  He received a call from a customer he knew by name.  She 
was calling on her cell phone from the meat section of a large chain store competitor 
where the roast was on sale for $1.00/ lb. (14%) cheaper than he was offering.  She 
wanted to know, “did he think their quality was good?”  Not only did she know the 
relative prices in both stores, but she was using the local “butcher” not to discuss quality 
narrowly, but quality in a broad commodity sense. Though only an anecdote, the story 
from this high-end retailer reflects on the current state of the meat value proposition in 
the US.   
The meat case analysis supports the observations from the interviews.  While the 
independent stores were the highest priced, the prices were not correlated with meat 
quality (Table 3).  What the consumer was purchasing was store service and convenience.  
The generic red meats were all of similar grade and sourced from one of the large 
packers, but price was 53% higher on average in the independent stores.  Brands across 
the four stores commanded a 42% premium over the generic or private label alternative.  
Yet, as noted above, branded and enhanced meat products are much more common in the Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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chain retailer than the independents.  Not carrying unique meat products certainly appears 
to limits the independent’s degrees of  freedom as they try to compete with the larger 
chain stores. 
Conclusion  
Our results appear to show a very different response to the turbulence over the last 
ten years by the US meat chain when compared to the European industry.  The U.S. chain 
appears to be taking an incremental approach focusing on price, labor and distribution 
efficiency, and product performance such as shelf life, trim, and retail readiness.  Third 
party verification and government involvement beyond HAACP and the traditional 
inspection system are not evident.  The major meat packers in the country appear to be 
satisfying the needs of downstream chain members whether they be chain store retailers 
or high-end independents.  Even the most exclusive retailer is happy with the current 
offerings from the national meat packers.   
Branding is still done on a limited basis and does not address such attributes as 
traceability, source verification, or organic.  National meat packing companies appear to 
readily be able to serve the demand for social attributes and are able to use such 
marketing terms as “natural” or “angus,” which may confuse rather than clarify product 
offerings for downstream chain members and consumers.  Chain members are very clear 
in their language choice relying on standard USDA commodity grades (i.e. select, choice 
or prime) to describe and market/procure their products.  The disruptive issues as BSE, 
FMD, and GMO did not arise as needs requiring attention.  While chain members had 
heard of these issues, and could define them, they all felt secure with the current chain 
structure.  Not only were the large packers well-positioned to deliver differentiated Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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products, large retailers too seem the most aggressive bringing new products into their 
stores.  With respect to the meat case this seems counter-intuitive as the outer perimeter 
(fresh and ready-to-eat foods such as fish, meat, and bread) of the store holds the greatest 
opportunities for independent retailers to differentiate themselves.  Instead of 
differentiating themselves with products, our smaller retailers differentiated themselves 
with service and shopping convenience.  
Paradoxically the preferences as stated by the Swanson consumers were quite 
different from the store meat cases they were patronizing.  While many respondents 
stated that social attributes were “very important” these attributes were only found in a 
limited way in the meat case.  Those products that offered these attributes, “natural,” 
were by-in-large poultry products, even though most meat in the meat case is not poultry.  
While Swanson et al describe significant demand for traceability and organic attributes, 
retailers did not see it as a high priority nor were they offering it in their meat case.  The 
needs assessment results and the meat case analysis were consistent with each other.  
Supply chain members, especially those downstream, were not frustrated that they 
couldn’t get the products their consumers were demanding.  For them, in terms of product 
offering, the chain was working well.   
We caution researchers working in this area of social attributes, that framing and 
biasing are real risks in this type of research.  Not only is there a lot of media coverage, 
but the recent events in the industry have raised numerous new issues.  Norms, language, 
and a common understanding of what is real, what is temporary, or what is permanent are 
still in flux.  Neither researchers, policy makers nor the industry have the benefit of 
hindsight at this point in time to lend clarity to these issues.  Therefore for researchers Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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working at the leading edge of these phenomena it is important to err on the side of 
neutrality and objectivity.  In this research we attempted to address this issue by utilizing 
the needs assessment approach and direct video observation.   
 
Are retailers being irrational not offering what consumers want or do consumer 
attitudes differ from their behavior?  We argue, with the U.S. consumer, the fundamentals 
of price and pristine presentation dominate.  Our data supports that.  Not paradoxically 
these characteristics are compatible with the set of supplier competencies and the 
efficiency needs of the large surface retailers.   
One general result summarizing all of our needs assessments, is that the chain is 
generally happy with the value package (price and quality) being offered.  This seems 
paradoxical given the recent events in the global meat industry.  Despite significant 
turbulence in the meat industry over the last ten years, U.S. chain has fundamentally 
changed little; it is still scale and commodity driven
v.  The European chain on the other 
hand is in the process of significant structural change in its push to provide a source 
verified and fully traceable product.  The results of our study seem to indicate that the 
U.S. meat industry has reacted quite differently to the recent events concerning meat 
quality and traceability.  One explanation is that the domestic markets between the US 
and Europe are so different that alternative supply chains structures are warranted.  Are 
the food safety risks really any greater in the U.S. than in Europe?  If so then the U.S. 
industry would appear to be taking huge risks.  Or are the Europeans over investing in ex-
ante control systems with higher capital and transaction related costs?  This has 
interesting implications as European and US packers compete in many of the same global Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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markets, i.e. Japan.  Are US producers at a competitive disadvantaged because of quality 
or are European packers at a disadvantage because of price?   
What we may be describing is Levinthal’s “rugged landscape” where competitive 
complexities are so great in the meat industry, that there are numerous peaks from which 
one can compete.  There may not be one way to achieve safe meat, but numerous 
mechanisms, institutions, organizational forms, and supply chain structures.  Thus what 
some might see as denial to obvious changes in the consumer environment, the US meat 
industry may simply be logically incremental.  Only in hindsight will we know for sure. Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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Figure 1. Swanson Meat Survey Results 
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Figure 5. Meat SKU Branded Products (N=143) 
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Figure 6. Meat SKU Natural Products (N=56) 
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Income and demographic information was obtained from the consumer survey.  





  Approx. size  Income/fam.  Caucasian Afric-Amer.  Latino  Others 
  sq. ft  $  %  %  %  % 
Independent 1  22000  94750  94.7  1.5  1.1  2.3 
Independent 2  45000  126750  97.4  0.5  -  1.0 
Coop.  50000  66000  39.2  51.5  1.2  8.0 
Retail chain*  65000  126750  97.4  0.5  -  1.0 Goldsmith et al, University of Illinois     May, 2002 
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Table 3.  Selected Meat Price Comparisons Across the Four Sample Stores  
1.49 1.29 Turkey Tails
1.59 1.39 1.59 0.79 1.69 Cut Up Fryer
1.19 1.29 1.49 1.59 Whole Fryer
1.49 0.89 Pinwheel (Thigh & Leg)
0.99 1.79 Thigh (Natural)
0.99 0.79 1.99 1.29 Thigh
0.99 0.79 1.99 1.29 Thigh
1.49 3.39 Bone-In Breast
3.99 3.99 4.99 4.99 BLSL Breast (Natural)
2.99 2.49 4.59 3.99 4.99 BLSL Breast
4.99 2.99 4.99 5.99 Leg of Lamb
9.99 8.99 12.99 8.99 Loin Chops
3.29 2.19 4.99 Chops
5.99 4.99 5.99 5.49 Tenderloin 
2.99 4.99 4.99 4.39 Boneless Pork Roast
0.99 2.64 5.09 5.29 4.59 Pork Chop - Boneless Butterfly
4.99 5.99 5.79 7.99 4.99 London Broil
9.99 7.99 8.99 6.99 Porterhouse Steak Choice
3.99 3.79 3.99 3.19 Ground Sirloin
Private  Generic Brand Generic Brand Generic Brand Generic  Brand Meat Category/Product
RC CO I2 I1 
Endnotes 
 
                                                 
i Some of these strategies and new marketing approaches are already taken place in the US meat industry. 
For instance, warehouse clubs, foodservice entities and some meat processors have started marketing 
campaigns of branded products to change meat commodity perception to a value-added category (Major 
2001). Likewise, new initiative of vertical coordination between producers and processor to assure quality 
products and share financial risks are becoming common (Katz and Boland 2000). Government agencies, 
like the USDA, are supporting process-verification systems to control and verify each phase of meat 
processing (Castaldo, 2001). Nonetheless it is difficult to assess whether these strategies represent a current 
trend or isolated initiatives yet. 
ii Interviews involved a cooperative wholesaler as well as a cooperative retailer.  The cooperatives 
were particularly valuable because management needs to be very responsive to the membership due to 
unique governance structure.  Any member concerns are generally transmitted as unmet needs for the 
procurement manager.  This transparency provided important insights into the current state of meat demand 
and how well the chain was performing.  For example, it would be hypothesized that SKU counts would be 
higher in the co-op retailer (ceteris paribus), and that was the case. 
 
iii                    
Amish Brand, Bell & Evans, Burgers’, Catelli, Chef’s Requested, Chiappetti, Coleman, Flavor Best, 
Plantation, Rose’s, The Turkey Store, Trail Boss   
 
iv The notion of “natural” to can be misleading, because each natural program is certified, not defined by 
the USDA.  The circumstances under which the use of the term "natural" may be used on the labeling of 
meat and poultry products are described in Policy Memo 055, "Natural Claims." Policy Memo 055 
provides that the term "natural" may be applied only to products that contain no artificial ingredients, 
coloring ingredients, or chemical preservatives; and the product and its ingredients are not more than 
minimally processed. Minimally processed products that do not contain these types of ingredients, such as 
fresh meat and poultry, will automatically qualify for the use of the term "natural" on product labeling.  
v Applying the concepts of Prahahlad and Hamel (1990) to the US pork industry, did integration address the 
productivity gap or the opportunity gap?  Is the dominant model an architectural innovation (revolution) or 
a novel form of a continuous progression (evolution)? 